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Mulligan v. The Queen
By GRAHAM PARXER*
The Supreme Court of Canada has recently been invited to examine the
relationship between the insanity defence under section 16 of the Criminal
Code and the partial defence of intoxication which is still governed by the
common law. The law relating to the latter role is still dominated by the
House of Lords in D.P.P. v. Beard although the tests laid down in that case
have recently been subjected to scrutiny.
The Supreme Court of Canada was invited to take a broad approach to
the problems of defining criminal responsibility and the ways in which mens
rea could be negated by irresponsibility. The Court refused to accept the
invitation and the psychiatric evidence was treated rather narrowly.
The accused was charged with the murder of his wife to whom he had
been married one week. In the hours before the stabbing of his wife, Mulligan
had consumed "a substantial amount of beer and some whiskey." Mulligan
told the police that he did not mean to kill his wife but had gone berserk
when she attempted to induce a miscarriage with a wire coat-hanger. There
was some weak evidence to support this story: an untwisted coat hanger was
found but Mrs. Mulligan was not in fact pregnant and there was no damage
to her vagina or uterus.
The defences and partial defences raised were intoxication, insanity, and
provocation. The only evidence given at the trial was that of a psychiatrist.
This evidence was flimsy as the psychiatrist, Dr. Butler, had only interviewed
Mulligan once for ninety minutes, six months after the killing.
Dr. Butler testified that, at the time of the killing, the accused was "in a
dissociated state of reaction" which arose from "particular stresses in a
certain environment" and, in particular, "a gross personality disorganization"
and "acute breakdown" resulting from the wife's threatened abortion. Dr.
Butler was of the opinion that the accused had a defence under section 16 of
the Criminal Code. Mulligan, in the doctor's view, was "unable to appreciate
the nature and consequences of his actions in the sense of being 'sensitively'
aware of the nature and consequences of his actions." This dissociative state
was caused by "a combination of psychological stress and alcohol." 1
The jury convicted Mulligan of murder. The Ontario Court of Appeal
in a unanimous decision, and the Supreme Court of Canada, by a 6 to 3
majority, dismissed his appeals against conviction. The major concern of this
paper is the psychiatric evidence in relation to the partial defence of intoxica-
tion. This was also the sole question addressed by the Supreme Court of
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Canada. There was no complaint about the way in which the trial judge
directed the jury on the insanity defence.
The issues raised in the Ontario Court of Appeal were:
1. That the learned trial Judge erred in failing to relate the evidence with respect
to the appellants mental state, apart altogether from the defences of insanity,
provocation and intoxication, to the issue of the existence of the intent necessary
to constitute murder.
2. That the learned trial Judge erred in instructing the jury that a sane person is
deemed to intend the natural consequences of his act.
3. That the learned trial Judge erred in failing to direct the jury that if at the
end of the whole case they were left in a state of reasonable doubt as to whether
the offence proved was murder or manslaughter, that the jury should convict of
manslaughter only.2
Speaking for the Court of Appeal, Martin J.A. stated:
The jury in finding the accused guilty of murder must necessarily have rejected
the defence of intoxication. The jury in rejecting the defence of intoxication must
have been satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the combination of emotional
stress and the consumption of alcohol did not render the accused incapable of
having the necessary intents
In addition, the Ontario appellate court found that the defence of non-
insane automatism was not a possibility because the only causes of mental
irresponsibility were disease of the mind or intoxication. On the second
ground of appeal Martin J.A. decided that the trial judge had been in error
because a jury should not be told that a sane person is "deemed" to intend
the natural consequences of his act. However, the court decided that no
substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred:
... the jury, having rejected the defences of insanity and intoxication, could not
reasonably have failed to draw the inference that the accused intended to kill
the deceased or to cause her bodily harm likely to cause death, being reckless
whether or not death ensued and.., a reasonable jury, properly instructed,...
would inevitably have reached a verdict of murder.4
The Court of Appeal also rejected the third ground, although in their
view the jury direction was not free from mistakes.
The issues were reduced before the Supreme Court of Canada which
granted leave to appeal on the question of whether the trial judge "as a
matter of law, should, when dealing with the issue of drunkenness, have put
to the jury the medical evidence of Dr. Butler respecting the dissociative
state of mind.. . ."5 Martland I., for the majority, decided that the trial
judge was under no obligation "to instruct the jury specifically to consider
again, when dealing with the defence of drunkenness, Dr. Butler's evidence
concerning dissociative reaction."
2 (1974), 18 C.C.C. (2d) 270 at 274.
51d. at 276.
41d. at 278-79.
5 Supra, note 1 at 270.
6 Id. at 272.
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Dr. Butler had been questioned by the trial judge on the question of
intoxication:
Q. Then let me ask you this. From the evidence that has been recounted to you
by Mr. Kielb and Mr. McMurtry and from what you have been told by the
accused, is it your view that the accused was intoxicated from the consumption of
alcoholic beverage to such a degree that he was incapable of forming the intent
at that time, forgetting about the dissociative state?
A. No, I don't think so. He had been functioning fairly well up to the point
where he was faced with this emotional crisis. He apparently functioned fairly
well after that. I have seen people playing the piano when they were drunk who
would pass out and stay put for a few minutes and then continue on. They would
have no memory for the time they had passed out and there was nothing else
involved.
Q. Like a man who drives a car home, puts it in the garage, closes the door and
has no recollection of doing it?
A. That is right.
Q. Then from your analysis and opinion, the accused was not intoxicated, that
he was capable of forming the intent to kill as a result of the consumption of
alcohol? You say it is this dissociative state?
A. I think it is a combination of the two.
Q. If one leaves aside the dissociative situation, you say he was intoxicated?
A. Yes, I think he was intoxicated. 7
At another point, the doctor had said that alcohol had been a factor in the
dissociative reaction but not a major one.
In a rather simplistic explanation of Dr. Butler's evidence, Martland J.
noted the doctor's testimony that the dissociative reaction began at the time
of, or immediately prior to, the offence. Justice Martland commented:
This is not, therefore, a case in which, because of a pre-existing condition, the
appellant was more likely to become incapable as a result of consuming alcohol.
If that had been the case, Dr. Butler's evidence would have significance in rela-
tion to the defence of drunkeness.8
This statement suggests that the accused was perfectly sane until 2:30
a.m. on November I1, 1972 and then became insane as the result of the
behaviour of the victim. Perhaps the psychiatrist's evidence lent itself to that
interpretation but surely that is not what Dr. Butler had in mind. On the
insanity defence, which admittedly was rejected by the jury, the seeds of
Mulligan's disorder were built into his psychological or physiological makeup
and were raised from dormancy by the events of November 11. What pre-
existing condition did Martland J. have in mind?
If the insanity defence, which was not before the Supreme Court of
Canada, is ignored, there is a very different treatment of the facts and issues
by the dissenting Spence J. Dr. Butler had referred to Mulligan's addiction
to "speed" and his addiction to alcohol at the age of sixteen. Finally, the
psychiatrist had stated that "some alcoholics become disturbed or deranged
on a relatively small amount of alcohol."
7 Supra, note 2 at 273.
8 Supra, note 1 at 271.
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Spence J. made a very thorough survey of the doctor's evidence and of
the trial judge's very long jury summation. He quoted at length from the
psychiatric evidence. Admittedly, there were some inconsistencies.0 But the
confusion may be more apparent than real. The psychiatrist said that the
accused was drunk but under the D.P.P. v. Beard rule, perhaps he meant
that the accused was not so drunk as to be incapable of forming the intent
to commit the crime. Yet with the combination of intoxication and insanity,
the expert witness was able to say that he could not form the necessary intent
and this is the very issue which split the court.
The defence lawyer had submitted to the trial judge that the consumption
of alcohol was only one element which the jury should consider in deciding
whether the accused had the necessary intent. In addition, he argued that the
external stress should be taken into account. Spence I. agreed that the jury
was misdirected if they thought that they "could come to the conclusion that
they should arrive at their decision by reference to only part of that evidence
and exclude other evidence."' 0
Dickson J. agreed, and in a supplementary dissenting judgment, added
some important comments. His remarks showed an inclination to examine
the broader issues. The narrower rule to be extracted from this dissenting
judgment would be that the trial judge should direct a jury on a subjective
test for the intoxication defence which would take into account the effect of
the alcohol "upon the particular accused, at the particular time, and in his
then mental state."" Dickson J. has a very simple and straightforward
explanation for this approach; that the mental condition of the accused is a
relevant consideration because it affects capacity to form an intention.
On a broader basis, Dickson I. looked at intent and quite rightly pointed
out that the evidence of drunkenness must be related to the accused's mental
state:
A rigid categorization of defences, keeping medical evidence of insanity entirely
separate from evidence of drunkenness is not only unrealistic but a departure
from all that is embraced in the phrase mens rea.12
This approach, which unfortunately is in dissent, is to be applauded.
The dissent refuses to place defences, and the evidence, in watertight com-
partments. It is reminiscent of a statement in D.P.P. v. Beard18 by Lord
Birkenhead L.C. which has been frequently considered by assiduous students
of that case to be the true ratio of the decision. Lord Birkenhead said:
It is true that in such cases the specific intent must be proved to constitute the
particular crime, but this is, on ultimate analysis, only in accordance with the
ordinary law applicable to crime, for, speaking generally,... a person cannot be
convicted of a crime unless the mens was rea.14
9 See quotation cited supra, note 7.
10 Supra, note 1 at 277.
lid. at 278.
12 Id.
13 [1920] A.C. 479.
14 Id. at 504.
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This suggests that if that troublesome term "specific intent" has any
meaning, it refers to subjective mens rea which can be negated by intoxica-
tion. By extension of the remarks of the dissenters in Mulligan, this "specific
mens rea can also be negated by a combination of intoxication and other
factors affecting the mental state."
The highest court in Canada should be encouraged to develop legal
principles of criminal law for this country. Particularly when the Criminal
Code is silent, as it is with respect to the defence of intoxication, students of
the criminal law, and the lower courts, would appreciate some exposition on
such basic issues as mens rea and the defence and partial defences which
negate or affect the mental element in crime.
Unfortunately, appointees to the Supreme Court of Canada are seldom
lawyers who have specialized in criminal law or who have had a wide
experience with this branch of the law at the trial level. The judgments tend
to reflect this lack of expertise. Too often the majority judgments in the
Supreme Court seem to be exercises in the re-examination of the evidence
with the judges impliedly saying that they would have probably convicted the
accused and leaving it at that. The substantive criminal law is given very
little attention by the Court. There is little discussion of mens rea. Dickson .
is quite correct in his criticism that the majority judgment has created or
perpetuated watertight compartments for mens rea which are contrary to good
sense and also show lack of regard for extra-legal data which explain the
workings of the human mind or the behavioural motivations of the accused.
The Supreme Court missed an excellent opportunity to revise the defence
of intoxication and in particular the second rule in D.P.P. v. Beard which
introduced the "specific intent" notion. No one seems to know the meaning
of that term and it has been under attack in recent years. The Canadian
courts are in disagreement as to its scope. In R. v. George,15 Fauteux I. tried
to explain the meaning of specific intent by distinguishing between an
"intention as applied to acts considered in relation to their purpose" and an
"intention as applied to acts considered apart from their purposes."'16 This
may be a convenient rule for purposes of judicial discretion but it makes no
sense in terms of legal logic. If the partial defence of intoxication is merely a
mitigation, then this should be clearly stated, and meaningless formulae
should be dispensed with. This confusion is most clearly seen in the disagree-
ment in Canadian courts on the issue of whether intoxication can be a partial
defence to the crime of rape.' 7 This seems to be a crime which has a very
obvious secondary purpose, to use Fauteux J.'s classification. The Ontario
courts agree but the British Columbia courts will not admit a partial defence
of intoxication in such circumstances.
'5 [1960] S.C.R. 871; (1960), 128 C.C.C. 289.
16 Id. at 877.
17 Cf. Regina v. Vandervoort (1961), 34 C.R. (Ont. C.A.) 380. Regina v. Boucher
(1962), 39 C.R. 242 (B.C.C.A.) and Regina v. Leary (1976), 26 C.C.C. (2d) 522
(B.C.C.A.) which follows Boucher and decided that the principle in D.P.P. v. Morgan,
[1976] A.C. 182 (H.L.) has not changed the law.
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The Beard case was an unfortunate case on which to construct a rule
because the House of Lords may well have decided on a very narrow ratio
decidendi that intoxication will only rarely apply to a felony-murder situation.
The same attitude is echoed by Fauteux J. in George when he says that "short
of a degree of drunkenness creating a condition tantamount to insanity, such
a situation could be metaphysically conceived in an assault of the kind here
involved.' 8
The House of Lords has recently examined it in Majewski" on the
defence of intoxication itself, and has admitted that the defence is a com-
promise, a judge-made fiction, illogical and a sham, but declined to overturn
the Beard rule because that was the job of the legislature. There are dicta
in the Majewski judgments which recognise that very drunk persons who
commit violent acts are dangerous and that society may need protection from
such persons. Therefore their acquittal, because their mens was not rea, may
not be an appropriate response and a category of "drunk and dangerous"
offender should perhaps be created. Under the Beard rule, the easier but
illogical route has been taken that manslaughter is not an offence of specific
intent and therefore intoxication is an inappropriate defence. This has most
recently been raised in the English case of R. v. Lipman,20 which has been
criticized as another illogical decision in this area of the law.2'
Earlier reference has been made to the quality of judgment-writing in
the Supreme Court of Canada which too often shows, at most, a review of
the facts. This is certainly true of the majority judgment of Martland J. which
does not quote a single case. At the very least, one would have thought that
the Supreme Court might have referred to its own recent decision in Perrault
v. The Queen22 in which a judge well-versed in criminal law, Fauteux C.J.,
had examined a similar problem, the interrelationship of drunkenness and
provocation. In addition, Fauteux C.J. had examined the important British
decision of Attorney-General for Northern Ireland v. Gallagher23 which dis-
cussed the more general issue of the relationship, if any, between intoxication
and insanity. Not even the dissents in Mulligan cite these two decisions.
The majority in Perrault followed Lord Denning in Gallagher to the
extent that the defence of provocation must be based on the objective test of
the reasonable person. Fauteux C.J. decided that when the accused failed on
both tests individually he could not combine them for a successful defence.
(The accused was acquitted by an Alberta judge sitting without a jury and
the Crown successfully appealed the acquittal.) Indeed, the two partial
defences cancelled each other out; if only a reasonable person can claim
provocation, then that does not include an intoxicated accused. If a person
18 Supra, note 15 at 879 (S.C.R.).
19 [1976] 2 W.L.R. 623 (H-.).
20 [1970] 1 Q.B. 152 (C.A.).
21 See Glazebrook, 85 L.Q.R. 28 at 45 as quoted by English in [1970] Crim. L.R.
15 at 22.
22 [1971] S.C.R. 196 (S.C.C.).
23 [1963] A.C. 349 (H.L.).
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simply becomes provoked because he gives way to a passion because he is
intoxicated, then that can not be a defence.
The minority took a different approach. First, Laskin J. was critical of
the appeal court for substituting a verdict of its own. Secondly, he was of the
opinion, impliedly shared by Dickson J. in Mulligan, that it was wrong to
confuse "the effect of drunkenness on the capacity to form the requisite
intent with the question whether there was such intent in fact. '2 4 This state-
ment is not meant to make any incursion on the defences of provocation or
drunkenness but is simply saying that the trial judge must be satisfied that
intent exists. In Laskin J.'s opinion, the trial judge had not properly addressed
himself to this issue. This view of the dissenting justice reiterates the mens
must be rea argument and follows the traditional view that all the elements of
the offence must be proved.
This opinion was shared by the English Court of Appeal in Sheehan,2 5
a murder case. The conviction was quashed. While the appeal court agreed
that a drunken intent was still an intent, the following general principle
was added:
[Tihe jury should merely be instructed to have regard to all the evidence,
including that relating to drink, to draw such inference as they think proper from
the evidence, and on that basis to ask themselves whether they feel sure that at
the material time the defendant had the requisite intent.2 6
In succinct form, the views of the court in Sheehan, and of the dissenting
judges in Mulligan and Perrault suggest that the principle in Woolmington v.
D.P.P.27 is more important than the second rule in Beard v. D.P.P. There are
also indications in a recent Manitoba case that at least one judge was
concerned about the narrow Beard-Perrault rule. O'Sullivan J.A. stated the
following:
... the question is not whether the accused had the capacity to form the intent
but whether he in fact formed the intent or had the fore-sight, which the
definition of the crime requires ... It would be a very remarkable thing if the law
required proof of an actual intention, or actual foresight in the case of a sober
man, but dispensed with that requirement as soon as there was evidence that he
had taken drink. A defence that the accused did not intend or foresee the
consequences of his conduct, which would be quite incredible if he were sober,
may be readily credible if he was drunk.28
The cases which have been examined may not seem germane to the
peculiar facts of Mulligan, because none of them involves the issue of insanity.
Certainly Attorney General of Northern Ireland v. Gallagher is a case which
cannot be ignored although it is hoped that it will not be followed in Canada.
That case is in error because it does not look at the large issue of mens rea
and takes the compartmentalized view which Dickson J. found unsatisfactory.
2 4 Supra, note 22 at 207.
25 [1975] 1 W.L.R. 739.
2
6 Id. at 744.
27 [1935] A.C. 462.
28 Commentary in [1975] Crim. L.R., 340 cited in Regina v. Ducharme (1976),
28 C.C.C. (2d) 478 at 479 (Man. C.A.).
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It can be distinguished because Lord Denning found that Gallagher was not
suffering from a disease of the mind brought on by drink. In Mulligan, the
expert evidence showed that the drink was a contributing factor.
Gallagher can be attacked on a broader basis than arguments about the
evidence. Lord Denning was wrong in equating what he calls "the Dutch
courage" rule from Beard (drinking to give oneself courage to do the killing)
with psychopathy induced by drinking. The following shows the superficial
approach of Lord Denning, as well as the moralistic stance which he often
adopts in criminal cases:
The wickedness of his mind before he got drunk is enough to condemn him,
coupled with the act which he intended to do and did do. A psychopath who
goes out intending to kill, knowing it is wrong, and does kill, cannot escape the
consequences by making himself drunk before doing it.29
This shows compartmentalizing of the human mind at its very worst.
The Supreme Court of Canada goes one step further: the majority in Mulligan
manages to arrive at somewhat the same conclusion without even discussing
the law. The facts are enough for them.
Addendum
The Supreme Court of Canada has given some further thought to the
problem of intoxication as a partial defence to a criminal charge. In Leary v.
The Queen,30 the majority (6 of 9 judges) have decided that the British
Columbia decision in Boucher should be preferred to the Ontario rule in
Vandervoort; the prevailing view now is that rape is a crime of general intent
and intoxication is not an available defence.
Pigeon J., for the majority, wrote a conventional judgment embracing
the Beard rules and Fauteux J.'s distinction in George between general intent
and specific intent. In George, Fauteux J. had described the former as
"intention as applied to acts considered in relation to their purposes" and the
latter as "intention as applied to acts considered apart from their purposes."
This distinction may sound plausible but seems to have little practical use.
Indeed, Dickson J., dissenting in Leary, goes further and calls it an "irrational
dichotomy" because "there are not, and have never been, any legally adequate
criteria for distinguishing the one group of crimes from the other."
In the light of Dickson J.'s remarks in Mulligan, these additional
remarks in Leary are worth further thoughtful study:
There is much to be said for the view that drunkenness should not be regarded
as standing alone but rather as possibly contributing to some condition incon-
sistent with criminal responsibility. Thus, insanity caused by excessive drinking
affords an answer to a criminal charge but it is the insanity to which attention is
directed and the cause of the insanity is irrelevant. The law has always
distinguished intoxication, however gross, from insanity, permanent or temporary,
induced by intoxication; psychiatry draws no such distinction.
When an accused, in answer to a criminal charge, says that he was so sodden as
to be virtually an automaton, incapable of knowing what he was about, his
29 Supra, note 23 at 382.
30 (1977), 33 C.C.C. (2d) 473; 37 C.R.N.S. 60 (S.C.C.).
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defence is not drunkenness but an absence of voluntariness caused by excessive
drinking. The question then is whether the act was voluntary. Likewise, when the
offence with which he is charged includes a mental element which must be
established by the Crown, such as intention or recklessness, it should be open to
an accused to contend that upon all of the evidence the Crown has failed to
establish the requisite mental element. The law should take no note of the
inducing cause which led to the incapacity or lack of intent. On the other hand,
it is generally recognized that the usual effect of drinking is merely to remove
self-restraints and inhibitions and induce a sense of self-confidence and, perhaps,
aggressiveness. If the accused was drunk at the time of the alleged offence but it
is proved that he did the act intentionally or recklessly, it is irrelevant that but
for the drinking he would never have done the act. The intent or recklessness,
constituting the necessary mental element, is present and the fact that, by reason
of drink, his judgment and control relaxed so that he more readily gave way to
his instinctual drives, avails him nothing.
Students of the criminal law, all of whom would undoubtedly like to see
more rationality in the law of crime, can take heart that there is a judge on
the Supreme Court of Canada who is giving some serious thought to these
problems.
